在筆者看來(lái)：戰(zhàn)略研究是一個(gè)跨學(xué)科的研究領(lǐng)域，它并不專屬哪一個(gè)學(xué)科，應(yīng)當(dāng)說(shuō)戰(zhàn)略研究是國(guó)際關(guān)系研究的關(guān)注重點(diǎn)，同時(shí)戰(zhàn)略研究也在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、軍事學(xué)、物理學(xué)等其他學(xué)科有相關(guān)體現(xiàn)，在不同學(xué)科領(lǐng)域?qū)?zhàn)略研究的側(cè)重點(diǎn)有一定區(qū)別，但整體而言是關(guān)系到國(guó)家整合戰(zhàn)略資源與實(shí)現(xiàn)國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)的動(dòng)態(tài)平衡與長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)規(guī)劃，包括了理論研究與政策建議，相比純粹的國(guó)際關(guān)系理論而言，戰(zhàn)略研究理論講求很強(qiáng)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)性、歷史性與可操作性，更加強(qiáng)調(diào)腳踏實(shí)地和立足國(guó)家所面臨的地緣政治外部環(huán)境與國(guó)內(nèi)政治經(jīng)濟(jì)文化實(shí)際狀況。當(dāng)然考慮到戰(zhàn)略研究與國(guó)際關(guān)系研究實(shí)在有太多交集，甚至很多戰(zhàn)略家本身就是國(guó)際關(guān)系公認(rèn)的中層理論甚至是大理論范式的代表人，因此借助一個(gè)圖表可供參考。[1]

當(dāng)然，該表格的好處在于界定了戰(zhàn)略研究是安全研究的真子集，安全研究又是國(guó)際關(guān)系研究的一部分，國(guó)際關(guān)系研究又是廣義的政治科學(xué)的分支，但也容易認(rèn)為戰(zhàn)略研究就局限于政治科學(xué)。實(shí)際上只要國(guó)際體系的主要行為體是主權(quán)國(guó)家，就不可能回避的戰(zhàn)略的研究，設(shè)計(jì)的不同學(xué)科分支在很大程度上都是為了戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)服務(wù)，只不過(guò)一部分學(xué)科的一些目標(biāo)可能是更強(qiáng)調(diào)自身發(fā)展也能給全球提供思想公共產(chǎn)品，但本質(zhì)上學(xué)科在國(guó)家的戰(zhàn)略體系下的創(chuàng)設(shè)都有不同程度的目標(biāo)規(guī)劃（只是一部分學(xué)科的見(jiàn)效慢、影響深遠(yuǎn)；另一些學(xué)科的特定內(nèi)容是應(yīng)對(duì)眼前的危機(jī)或利益驅(qū)動(dòng)等）。當(dāng)然，筆者討論的戰(zhàn)略研究更多基于學(xué)理而非政治層面的，對(duì)戰(zhàn)略研究的了解不一定要為國(guó)家提供直接的戰(zhàn)略咨詢服務(wù)（也不是所有人都有這個(gè)能力或意愿），對(duì)戰(zhàn)略的思考本身有助于我們用一種跨學(xué)科的視野形成一種理解世界、發(fā)現(xiàn)我們所處時(shí)代的觀察路徑，進(jìn)而對(duì)我們?nèi)粘Ｉ罨驅(qū)W理思考構(gòu)成某種啟示或談資。

本文對(duì)戰(zhàn)略研究的內(nèi)容介紹主要來(lái)自于John Baylis,James J. Wirtz,Colin S. Gray編寫的《Strategy in the Contemporary World：An Introduction to Strategic Studies》一書(shū)，目前我還沒(méi)有讀過(guò)該書(shū)的中文版，因此就把英文版進(jìn)行解讀和擴(kuò)展，全部?jī)?nèi)容都是筆者總結(jié)提煉和理解基礎(chǔ)上的整合，并結(jié)合戰(zhàn)略研究領(lǐng)域的其他著作供讀者參考。

一、戰(zhàn)略的定義

從早期的軍事學(xué)角度而言，更多將戰(zhàn)略的定義與軍事手段的應(yīng)用與戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)勝利的結(jié)果聯(lián)系在一起。如克勞塞維茨（Carl von Clausewitz）將戰(zhàn)略定義為Strategy [is] the use of engagements forthe object of war。[2]克勞塞維茨作為拿破侖一世戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)時(shí)期的軍事家，更多是將他的學(xué)說(shuō)應(yīng)用（或認(rèn)為可以應(yīng)用）到歐洲的陸戰(zhàn)中，當(dāng)然，筆者認(rèn)為克勞塞維茨的《戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)論》對(duì)智力的提升和思辨遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不止是對(duì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的了解，當(dāng)然他的戰(zhàn)略概念確實(shí)更偏重軍事內(nèi)涵，不過(guò)《戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)論》書(shū)中對(duì)進(jìn)攻與防御、以及戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)必備的三要素（政治、暴力、偶然性）、還有戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)手段與政治目標(biāo)的相關(guān)性介紹，都體現(xiàn)出他超越時(shí)代的戰(zhàn)略視野。利德?tīng)枴す兀?/span>Liddell Hart）對(duì)戰(zhàn)略的定義超過(guò)了純粹的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)目標(biāo)，認(rèn)為：Strategy is the art of distributing andapplying military means to fulfill the ends of policy。[3]他對(duì)大戰(zhàn)略的定義就更為經(jīng)典：Grand strategy should both calculate and developthe economic resources and manpower of nations in order to sustain the fightingservices . . . it should not only combine the various instruments, but soregulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace—for itssecurity and prosperity。[4]哈特突出了政治目標(biāo)，而且如果看到哈特在《間接路線》一書(shū)中的戰(zhàn)略理解，是強(qiáng)調(diào)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)狀態(tài)與和平狀態(tài)之間的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)手段動(dòng)力問(wèn)題，這源于他對(duì)一戰(zhàn)、二戰(zhàn)和戰(zhàn)后和平締造的理解，但對(duì)哈特的思想也是褒貶不一，如米爾斯海默在《李德·哈特與歷史之鍾》里，就強(qiáng)調(diào)哈特的思想更多缺乏實(shí)踐指導(dǎo)，而且在戰(zhàn)略形勢(shì)發(fā)生變化后，人為強(qiáng)化自身的學(xué)說(shuō)影響，當(dāng)然，還是希望讀者可以自己閱讀哈特的著作、進(jìn)行不同視角的評(píng)判。

勞倫斯·弗里德曼（Lawrence Freedman）對(duì)戰(zhàn)略的定義是：The realm of strategy is one of bargainingand persuasion as well as threats and pressure, psychological as well asphysical effects, and words as well as deeds. This is why strategy is thecentral political art. It is about getting more out of a situation than thestarting balance of power would suggest. It is the art of creating power。這里的定義是筆者覺(jué)得比較全面的，因?yàn)樗婕暗接憙r(jià)還價(jià)和政治游說(shuō)，物質(zhì)和精神層面的威懾內(nèi)涵，以及行動(dòng)和語(yǔ)言的政治藝術(shù)。這既考慮到了戰(zhàn)略的理性平衡，也涉及到藝術(shù)（不容易掌控的、容易受到非理性因素的影響）。如果讀者看過(guò)理查德·勒博的《國(guó)家為何而戰(zhàn)？》，就能更深切理解榮譽(yù)、恐懼等戰(zhàn)略動(dòng)機(jī)是如何誘發(fā)國(guó)家陷入戰(zhàn)略冒險(xiǎn)甚至是主動(dòng)營(yíng)造必有一戰(zhàn)的戰(zhàn)略決心的。

“Because strategy provides the bridgebetween military means and political goals, students of strategy requireknowledge of both politics and military operations.”[5]盡管戰(zhàn)略研究包羅萬(wàn)象，筆者建議讀者看看鈕先鐘教授的《戰(zhàn)略研究入門》一書(shū)，該書(shū)將戰(zhàn)略這門學(xué)問(wèn)的重要性極為拔高（至少是筆者閱讀過(guò)的本國(guó)學(xué)者中對(duì)戰(zhàn)略研究最為推崇的一本書(shū)），但因?yàn)閼?zhàn)略的核心（或者說(shuō)國(guó)際關(guān)系的高級(jí)政治問(wèn)題仍然是首要的）是軍事手段與政治目標(biāo)的關(guān)系，因此戰(zhàn)略研究的前提是要了解軍事與政治相關(guān)的知識(shí)體系?！?/span>Strategy deals with the difficult problemsof national policy, the areas where political, economic, psychological, andmilitary factors overlap”。這句話足以體現(xiàn)戰(zhàn)略研究的交叉性與服務(wù)國(guó)家目標(biāo)的屬性。鑒于跨學(xué)科，如果有志于做戰(zhàn)略研究的讀者，可能需要至少對(duì)以下學(xué)科有所涉獵（當(dāng)然可以一種學(xué)科為主，其他學(xué)科就是碰到問(wèn)題需要研究時(shí)可以隨時(shí)補(bǔ)充骨架即可）：Strategy is best studied from aninterdisciplinary perspective. To understand the dimensions of strategy, it isnecessary to know something about politics, economics, psychology, sociology,and geography, as well as technology, force structure, and tactics。[6]

二、戰(zhàn)略研究與傳統(tǒng)現(xiàn)實(shí)主義的共同傳統(tǒng)（通約性）

（一）人性惡：In an anarchical system, power is the only currency ofvalue when security is threatened.[7]

（二）自修昔底德以來(lái)所強(qiáng)調(diào)的國(guó)際政治的強(qiáng)者為尊、國(guó)家自助、安全第一位：Who wins in international relations doesnot depend on who is right according to

some moral orlegal ruling. As Thucydides demonstrated in his account of the Peloponnesianwars, power determines who gets their way. In international relations, mightmakes right.

（三）國(guó)際法、道德、國(guó)際制度作用是有限的。. In an international system without asupranational government, states will agree to laws when it suits them, butwill disregard them when their interests are threatened. When states want tobreak the rules, there is very little to stop them from doing it apart fromcountervailing force.

相信理論功底深厚的讀者能夠列舉一堆傳統(tǒng)共識(shí)，但筆者要補(bǔ)充的內(nèi)容是，戰(zhàn)略研究之所以被詬病，就是高度的政治應(yīng)用往往容易低估道德因素的權(quán)衡，而雖然現(xiàn)實(shí)主義對(duì)道德、國(guó)際法與制度的看重程度不如自由主義，但在愛(ài)德華·卡爾和漢斯·摩根索的著作中，有鮮明的現(xiàn)實(shí)主義與理想主義的調(diào)和色彩，認(rèn)為離開(kāi)道德談權(quán)力是不合邏輯的。同時(shí)，類似麥金德、斯拜克曼這些非正統(tǒng)的現(xiàn)實(shí)主義者（這源于地緣政治在內(nèi)容上與現(xiàn)實(shí)主義通約，但在理論地位上自豪斯霍弗與納粹生存空間論被唾棄后，長(zhǎng)期被主流現(xiàn)實(shí)主義游離于理論邊界之外。）也是重視權(quán)力與制度的并用，比如麥金德非常強(qiáng)調(diào)心臟地帶的戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定需要在德蘇兩國(guó)之間建立隔離帶，通過(guò)國(guó)際聯(lián)盟扶持一些東歐國(guó)家成為戰(zhàn)略緩沖，麥金德本人非常贊同國(guó)聯(lián)理應(yīng)借助權(quán)力政治發(fā)揮制度性的建構(gòu)作用，這一點(diǎn)被很多學(xué)者低估甚至強(qiáng)調(diào)地緣政治與現(xiàn)實(shí)主義是不講道德和制度的。麥金德·斯拜克曼、卡爾、摩根索這些學(xué)者的思想可能沒(méi)有后世描述的那樣排斥威爾遜主義，至多是批評(píng)國(guó)際制度安排缺乏權(quán)力政治考量、而非忽略制度與道德對(duì)權(quán)力沖突的緩和作用。

現(xiàn)實(shí)主義、自由主義、建構(gòu)主義都是高度政治性與戰(zhàn)略維度的，盡管不乏普適性的思想學(xué)術(shù)內(nèi)容體系（這也是國(guó)際關(guān)系研究不能總是強(qiáng)調(diào)徹底摒棄三大主義另立山頭做研究的重要性、它山之石可以攻玉），但三大范式無(wú)非就是在側(cè)重程度不同的三個(gè)維度進(jìn)行了戰(zhàn)略性的啟示思考：權(quán)力與安全、制度與相互依賴、觀念與文化，現(xiàn)實(shí)主義整體上最偏向戰(zhàn)略研究，尤其是進(jìn)攻性現(xiàn)實(shí)主義與防御性現(xiàn)實(shí)主義的分野；自由主義的初始目標(biāo)是實(shí)現(xiàn)美國(guó)延緩霸權(quán)衰落的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)；建構(gòu)主義是以頭腦風(fēng)暴的方式讓人相信烏托邦主義的世界圖景很難建構(gòu)、但又可以通過(guò)觀念改變的方式去做到（雖然亨廷頓的《文明的沖突與世界秩序的重建》一書(shū)褒貶不一，但至少說(shuō)明觀念與文化的共識(shí)想達(dá)成和解絲毫不亞于領(lǐng)土爭(zhēng)端零和博弈解決的困難程度）。

大戰(zhàn)略與地緣政治是密不可分的：

The emergence of geopoliticsreflected a new sense that the world was now a unified political space at theend of the nineteenth century, which emerged as a result of the imperialcompetition of European great powers.

●   It also reflected a shifting constellation ofpower, with British economic strength in decline and Germany and the UnitedStates rising as new powerful actors in world politics.

●   Classical geopolitical thought linksterritory to power and sees world politics as a competition between the mostpowerful states. It proposes that geographical and other environmental factorsexplain why some states thrive while others decline.

這段話充分體現(xiàn)了地緣政治是高度權(quán)力變量的考慮，是國(guó)家大戰(zhàn)略層面運(yùn)作的背景與效果。對(duì)地緣政治與大戰(zhàn)略的思維體系掌握非常有助于在歷史閱讀中發(fā)現(xiàn)研究問(wèn)題。

凱南的遏制戰(zhàn)略就是一種地理與權(quán)力變量的戰(zhàn)略應(yīng)用思考：Containmentwas first developed at the onset of the cold war by George F. Kennan, adiplomat who had studied the Soviet Union closely. He proposed a strategy whichrelied on countering Soviet influence 'bythe adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantlyshifting geographical and political points’。Bythe 1950s, the competition for spheres of influence between the United Statesand the Soviet Union acquired a global dimension, partly as a result ofdecolonization in Africa and Asia. Containment was reformulated and expandedinto what became known as 'domino theory’—the idea that Soviet influence had tobe countered everywhere, since one state turning communist could easily spreadcommunism to neighbouring states until an entire world region would fall.Containment was a form of geopolitics, but one which encompassed ideologicalcompetition as well as competition for resources. It required the US to engageacross all areas of the globe to stop the spread of communism, whether or notthe countries concerned were strategically important. In Vietnam in particular,hundreds of thousands of US soldiers were sent to help fight communistguerrillas in a costly, drawn-out, and ultimately unsuccessful war. Overall,containment was a consistent, if not always consistently implemented, grandstrategic framework that was remarkably long-lived. Since the Soviet Unionremained the much weaker economy, containment was an effective long-termstrategy that helped to drain Soviet resources, though it was by no means theonly factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union.

由此可見(jiàn)，這種遏制戰(zhàn)略本質(zhì)上還是一種消耗戰(zhàn)邏輯，并非是要消滅蘇聯(lián)，而是要用長(zhǎng)期的軍事與政治對(duì)抗拖垮蘇聯(lián)，但是拖垮的前提是什么？是蘇聯(lián)擴(kuò)張地緣空間會(huì)加劇有限資源的耗盡與國(guó)內(nèi)政治經(jīng)濟(jì)體系的崩潰，實(shí)質(zhì)上就是目標(biāo)與手段的平衡邏輯的戰(zhàn)略思維產(chǎn)物。

三、到底是戰(zhàn)略思想影響了歷史上的政治行為、還是政治行為塑造了戰(zhàn)略思想？這也是戰(zhàn)略研究經(jīng)常被詬病的一個(gè)原因。下面一段話供讀者參考，因考慮政治敏感性，不便于直接翻譯，筆者的主要觀點(diǎn)可以精要概況為：理論家擺脫政策干擾的判斷或者不了解政策實(shí)際的理論空想恐怕都是很難的，但是戰(zhàn)略研究如果被貶低為純粹的智庫(kù)政策建議就有些不倫不類的：

In general, strategists recognize the dangers ofdeveloping too cosy a relationship with officials when they advise governmentson a paid basis. Like many other experts (e.g. economists), however, they seeno necessary inconsistency between scholarship and advice. Because it is apractical subject, there are some benefits from analysing strategic issues atclose hand, providing that a detached approach is adopted. Policy advocacy, however,is a different matter. Some strategists do drift into the realm of advocatingspecific policies, but when they do so they slowly but surely lose theircredibility. People who make a career out of arguing for the adoption ofspecific policies or weapons systems gain a reputation for knowing the 'answer’regardless of the question that is posed.Another forceful criticism of strategicstudies is that it is part of the problem, not the solution. What opponentsmean by this is that the Clausewitzian perspective of strategists, which seesmilitary power as a legitimate instrument of policy, helps to perpetuate aparticular mindset among national leaders and the public that encourages theuse of force. It is this realist thinking, critics argue, which lies behind thedevelopment of theories of deterrence, limited war, and crisis management thatwere especially dangerous during the cold war。[8]

如果讀者了解豪斯霍弗的地緣戰(zhàn)略思想，在結(jié)合納粹德國(guó)的實(shí)際擴(kuò)張行為，就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)戰(zhàn)略思想與國(guó)家政治永遠(yuǎn)都是既難以割舍又難以完全應(yīng)用的。豪斯霍弗希望達(dá)成類似麥金德所提防的德蘇心臟地帶結(jié)盟和對(duì)英國(guó)海上主導(dǎo)權(quán)的挑戰(zhàn)，但希特勒德國(guó)盡管采納了很多豪斯霍弗的思想（或者說(shuō)政策的理論工具支撐），不過(guò)對(duì)蘇宣戰(zhàn)卻是豪斯霍弗反對(duì)的，德國(guó)最終在二戰(zhàn)失敗也側(cè)面說(shuō)明豪斯霍弗的地緣學(xué)說(shuō)的預(yù)見(jiàn)性還是有的，只不過(guò)國(guó)家實(shí)踐是作為負(fù)面案例佐證了觀點(diǎn)。喬治·凱南主要是強(qiáng)調(diào)政治遏制戰(zhàn)略，而美國(guó)實(shí)際的NSC68號(hào)文件更強(qiáng)調(diào)軍事遏制，相比前者更具進(jìn)攻性；同時(shí)凱南的思想在朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)前后也發(fā)生了一定變化，在堅(jiān)持自身的地緣戰(zhàn)略與遏制思想體系的同時(shí)，也從反對(duì)朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)到支持適度的介入，這一點(diǎn)如果有興趣的讀者可以閱讀《喬治·凱南與美國(guó)的東亞政策》一書(shū)，里面有詳細(xì)的介紹凱南在中國(guó)、日本問(wèn)題、朝鮮半島等東亞不同地區(qū)的政策影響力差異與歷史細(xì)節(jié)。

四、我們這個(gè)時(shí)代戰(zhàn)略研究的特征

戰(zhàn)略研究具有經(jīng)久不衰的傳統(tǒng)，也是中西方思想對(duì)話的重要領(lǐng)域，無(wú)論是孫子還是克勞塞維茨，跨越兩千多年的中西方代表，都有很多不是傳承的共識(shí)：

The logic of war and strategy is universal; it isvalid at all times and in all places. This is primarily because war is a humanactivity, and human nature has remained unchanged in the face of materialprogress. The same passions that motivated those who lived millennia agocontinue to drive us today. Although such strategic theorists as thenineteenth-century Prussian officer and philosopher Carl von Clausewitz and theancient Chinese author Sun Tzu wrote from very different historical andcultural experiences and thus viewed strategy from unique perspectives, thephenomenon they described—war—is the same. It is the character and conduct ofwar—how it is waged, by whom, and for what ends—that has changed over time.[9]

限于篇幅，就精要介紹一下筆者對(duì)戰(zhàn)略研究不會(huì)過(guò)時(shí)的一些理解：

（一）非傳統(tǒng)安全越發(fā)重要，但傳統(tǒng)安全的主導(dǎo)地位不會(huì)動(dòng)搖；因?yàn)閲?guó)際沖突與合作是高度政治的，哪怕是純粹的經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題，只要是政治家做出的決策也一定關(guān)涉政治目標(biāo)，政治主導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟(jì)而非經(jīng)濟(jì)主導(dǎo)政治仍然是戰(zhàn)略研究的一個(gè)理解思路（當(dāng)然并不絕對(duì)，在特定領(lǐng)域的相互依賴可能產(chǎn)生某些非線性、間接的非戰(zhàn)略影響，但最好視為是戰(zhàn)略研究領(lǐng)域的子議題而非與戰(zhàn)略無(wú)關(guān)。）

（二）全部戰(zhàn)術(shù)的失敗只會(huì)帶來(lái)戰(zhàn)略的失敗、強(qiáng)調(diào)戰(zhàn)略重要性不代表戰(zhàn)術(shù)不重要，一部分戰(zhàn)術(shù)失敗換來(lái)整體戰(zhàn)略成功是值得的。

（三）時(shí)間與空間的維度是理解戰(zhàn)略研究（或者是很多學(xué)科）的必備條件，因?yàn)閼?zhàn)略是要立足于特定的時(shí)間條件的機(jī)遇/限制以及選擇某一空間作為實(shí)踐場(chǎng)所，不同的時(shí)間與空間條件的組合會(huì)帶來(lái)戰(zhàn)略觀念的變化。技術(shù)變革也的確會(huì)對(duì)時(shí)間（到達(dá)目的地的時(shí)間長(zhǎng)短等）和空間（單位時(shí)間移動(dòng)的距離等）的戰(zhàn)略觀念構(gòu)成不可回避的影響。技術(shù)的變革不會(huì)導(dǎo)致地緣戰(zhàn)略研究的過(guò)時(shí)，因?yàn)榧夹g(shù)變革本身就是地緣研究的不可分割內(nèi)容，這源于馬漢與麥金德以來(lái)對(duì)技術(shù)、地理與政治高度戰(zhàn)略互動(dòng)性的理解描述。

（四）地緣政治本身就屬于大戰(zhàn)略研究，大戰(zhàn)略與現(xiàn)實(shí)主義傳統(tǒng)的密切程度，可以通約認(rèn)為如果說(shuō)地緣政治是過(guò)時(shí)的，就等于強(qiáng)調(diào)大戰(zhàn)略與現(xiàn)實(shí)主義本身也失去了很多研究的維度與學(xué)理價(jià)值。盡管三者并不能簡(jiǎn)單等同為一個(gè)體系框架，但確實(shí)可以有很多內(nèi)容深入探討，比如新古典現(xiàn)實(shí)主義的大戰(zhàn)略維度如果想進(jìn)一步實(shí)現(xiàn)突破，減少現(xiàn)實(shí)主義學(xué)說(shuō)在冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束以來(lái)逐漸空中樓閣的虛化困境，回歸地緣政治是根本性的理論實(shí)踐要求。

The concept of grand strategy was first developed inthe context of the Second World War and was an extension of the long-termstrategic view inherent in geopolitical thought.

●   Both theSoviet Union and the United States acted geopolitically during the cold war.Containment was a grand strategy informed by geopolitical reasoning, but drivenby ideological concerns rather than resource competition.

●   The revival ofgeopolitics in the 1970s occurred at a time when the US was seen to be inrelative decline, and means other than the nuclear arms race were sought tosecure its position.[10]

大戰(zhàn)略概念最早是在第二次世界大戰(zhàn)背景下提出的，是地緣政治思想中固有的長(zhǎng)期戰(zhàn)略觀的延伸。蘇聯(lián)和美國(guó)在冷戰(zhàn)期間都采取了地緣政治行動(dòng)。遏制是一項(xiàng)宏大的戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃，受到地緣政治因素的影響、意識(shí)形態(tài)擔(dān)憂的驅(qū)動(dòng)，而非資源競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的作用（筆者認(rèn)為地緣政治與大戰(zhàn)略學(xué)說(shuō)可以反駁經(jīng)濟(jì)決定論的觀點(diǎn)）。20世紀(jì)70年代地緣政治的復(fù)興，發(fā)生在美國(guó)被視為處于霸權(quán)相對(duì)衰落的時(shí)期，當(dāng)時(shí)美國(guó)尋求核軍備競(jìng)賽以外的其他戰(zhàn)略手段來(lái)確保其國(guó)際體系的主導(dǎo)地位。

大戰(zhàn)略應(yīng)高度重視地緣政治的作用，尤其是地理、技術(shù)變量對(duì)政治事務(wù)的影響：

       Geography is not a fixed and immutable factorin world affairs.

●   Technologicalchange affects the way that geographical factors play out in internationalpolitics.

●   Geographicalfactors matter both as external constraints and because they are interpretedand politically contested, and often part of identity narratives.

●   This dualitycomplicates the uses of geopolitics for grand strategy, but also adds a new,important dimension that makers of grand strategy need to take into account.

（五）戰(zhàn)略文化的研究是經(jīng)典議題，未來(lái)很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)期也不會(huì)過(guò)時(shí)。

（六）目標(biāo)與手段的平衡是戰(zhàn)略研究的經(jīng)典理解，但不要狹隘，有時(shí)候要讓目標(biāo)限定手段使用，有時(shí)候要提前預(yù)設(shè)目標(biāo)來(lái)增進(jìn)手段累進(jìn)的政治合理性，還有時(shí)候需要讓手段的實(shí)踐操作來(lái)驗(yàn)證與修訂戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)的規(guī)劃。之所以要制定戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)，也源于要抓住特定戰(zhàn)略機(jī)遇期（時(shí)間）與不同戰(zhàn)略地帶的輕重緩急不同（空間）。

（七）對(duì)中美關(guān)系的分析具有極高價(jià)值

The rise of China and the relative economic decline ofthe US are driving the current revival of interest in geopolitics and grandstrategy.

●   China’s economic expansion and its need forenergy supplies are already having an effect on political dynamics in variousregions of the world.

●   The US remainsmilitarily dominant. Russia, China, and some other states are rearming, but at presentthis is not a direct challenge.

●   Some suggestthat the US suffers from 'imperial overstretch’, spending so much on its defence budget that it is weakened overall.

●   The emphasisof grand strategy has shifted to peacetime development, partly because warbetween great powers now seems improbable.[11]

筆者并不認(rèn)為對(duì)美國(guó)霸權(quán)衰落的理解是一種單向度的必然論，霸權(quán)衰落可以重新復(fù)興、還可以在戰(zhàn)略透支過(guò)程中及時(shí)止損、也可能對(duì)手比霸權(quán)國(guó)失誤更多導(dǎo)致霸權(quán)國(guó)的實(shí)力看上去沒(méi)有明顯衰落，因此過(guò)于唱衰或者霸權(quán)長(zhǎng)存不變都是缺乏戰(zhàn)略理性的論調(diào)。

中國(guó)的崛起和美國(guó)的相對(duì)衰落，正在推動(dòng)當(dāng)前人們對(duì)地緣政治和大戰(zhàn)略的興趣復(fù)蘇。美國(guó)遭受帝國(guó)過(guò)度擴(kuò)張的困擾是自從杰克·斯奈德的《帝國(guó)的迷思》一書(shū)出版以來(lái)就成為新世紀(jì)國(guó)際關(guān)系理論爭(zhēng)論的焦點(diǎn)（至少筆者認(rèn)為這本書(shū)是極具學(xué)理與戰(zhàn)略應(yīng)用價(jià)值的標(biāo)志性著作，在冷戰(zhàn)后的美國(guó)戰(zhàn)略界絕對(duì)算是獨(dú)樹(shù)一幟）。只要詳細(xì)觀察，一些美國(guó)戰(zhàn)略界人士總結(jié)冷戰(zhàn)經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)啟示時(shí)，強(qiáng)調(diào)國(guó)防預(yù)算的適度增加能實(shí)現(xiàn)長(zhǎng)期戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)、而非通常理解的過(guò)度擴(kuò)張。可以判定美國(guó)對(duì)第三世界的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)行為不太可能終止，筆者認(rèn)為，這是美國(guó)這種非正式殖民的帝國(guó)所不太可能放棄的發(fā)揮海外地緣政治投射能力與地緣文化塑造能力的“機(jī)會(huì)”，地緣經(jīng)濟(jì)的擴(kuò)張則有助于提升美國(guó)模式的吸引力；而中國(guó)只要想崛起，就無(wú)法同時(shí)回避在地緣政治、地緣經(jīng)濟(jì)與地緣文化層面的發(fā)展，就勢(shì)必與美國(guó)會(huì)發(fā)生碰撞，中美就算真的迎來(lái)類似“古巴導(dǎo)彈時(shí)刻”也不必過(guò)于大驚小怪，正如1957年的“斯普特尼克恐慌”到今天已經(jīng)演變?yōu)?/span>5G技術(shù)的打壓。

不要認(rèn)為大戰(zhàn)略就是紙上談兵的無(wú)用學(xué)問(wèn)，有大戰(zhàn)略謀劃的意圖、哪怕戰(zhàn)略試錯(cuò)也比沒(méi)有大戰(zhàn)略要好太多。借用本文介紹該書(shū)著作的一段話作為結(jié)尾：

In a complex and fluid world, it has become much moredifficult to formulate grand strategies.

●   Rigid grandstrategies, or those based on the wrong assumptions, can have negativeconsequences, since they blind decision-makers to unpredictable changes in thestrategic environment.

●   For a large,powerful state, grand strategic planning may be necessary, since the effects ofsimply 'muddling through’ may be worse.

下面也為讀者預(yù)留一些該書(shū)提出的思考問(wèn)題，可以供大家閱讀一些文獻(xiàn)的問(wèn)題導(dǎo)引（讀者普遍英文應(yīng)該都比筆者要好很多，就不翻譯了）：

1. What are the aims of grand strategy?

2. Why is there renewed interest in geopolitics andgrand strategy at this particular historical juncture?

3. What explains the emergence of geopolitical thoughtat the turn of the twentieth century?

4. Compare and contrast evolving definitions of grandstrategy and geopolitics. How and why have these definitions changed?

5. To what extent was the grand strategy ofcontainment during the cold war motivated by geopolitical reasoning?

6. What are the problems inherent in formulating grandstrategies? Can they be overcome?

7. Why is grand strategy associated with the statecraftof great powers?

8. How has geopolitics traditionally been associatedwith grand strategy? What are the problems of this association?

9. If geopolitics is both about the 'out there’ andthe 'in here’, as Colin Gray has written, what is its use for the formulationof grand strategy?

10. Is the rise of China a challenge to US primacy?

總之，筆者認(rèn)為：戰(zhàn)略思維的素養(yǎng)絕非短期可以形成，也不是遇到問(wèn)題現(xiàn)學(xué)現(xiàn)賣，而是應(yīng)該將戰(zhàn)略研究的學(xué)術(shù)訓(xùn)練進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)略化管理與運(yùn)作，只有對(duì)戰(zhàn)略研究本身進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃，才能實(shí)現(xiàn)戰(zhàn)略研究的進(jìn)化。

      （注釋略）