     期刊簡(jiǎn)介 本期編委 【編譯】賀凡熙 金琳 劉瀟昱 蔡宇 陳舜波 【校對(duì)】徐垚晟 曹鵬鵬 【審核】金磊 【排版】趙怡雯  本期目錄 資源第一、勞工第二：自然資源與移民政策 【題目】Primary Resources, Secondary Labor: Natural Resources and Immigration Policy 【作者】Adrian J. Shin，科羅拉多大學(xué)博爾德分校政治學(xué)系助理教授 【摘要】 本文認(rèn)為，擁有豐富的自然資源導(dǎo)致發(fā)達(dá)民主國(guó)家對(duì)低技能移民的限制性政策。高價(jià)值自然資源的生產(chǎn)常常會(huì)排擠生產(chǎn)貿(mào)易商品的勞動(dòng)密集型企業(yè)。當(dāng)（貿(mào)易商品生產(chǎn)帶來(lái)的）有利于移民的商業(yè)利益由于去工業(yè)化而消失時(shí)（即“荷蘭病”），親移民聯(lián)盟在國(guó)內(nèi)政治中的力量就會(huì)被削弱。由于沒(méi)有強(qiáng)大的商業(yè)壓力要求增加移民，于是政策制定者將移民拒之門(mén)外，以適應(yīng)反移民者的利益。通過(guò)擴(kuò)展有關(guān)24個(gè)富裕民主國(guó)家移民政策的最新數(shù)據(jù)集，作者發(fā)現(xiàn)，具有豐富石油資源的民主國(guó)家更有可能對(duì)低技能移民采取限制性的政策，尤其是這些國(guó)家在國(guó)際貿(mào)易中面臨外國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的時(shí)候。本文的研究成果補(bǔ)充了以選民為基礎(chǔ)的移民政策理論，為有關(guān)自然資源的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和國(guó)際移民的新興研究做出了貢獻(xiàn)。 This article argues that substantial natural resource wealth leads to more restrictive low-skill immigration policy in advanced democracies. High-value natural resource production often crowds out labor-intensive firms that produce tradable goods. When these proimmigration business interests disappear due to deindustrialization, also known as the Dutch Disease, the proimmigration coalition weakens in domestic politics. Without strong business pressure for increased immigration, policy-makers close their doors to immigrants to accommodate anti-immigrant interests. Using a newly expanded dataset on immigration policy across twenty-four wealthy democracies, I find that oil-richdemocracies are more likely to restrict low-skill immigration, especially when their economies are exposed to foreign competition in international trade. The results supplement the voter-based theories of immigration policy and contribute to an emerging literature on the political economy of natural resources and international migration. 【編譯】賀凡熙 【校對(duì)】徐垚晟 【審核】金磊 衡量跨國(guó)遷徙中的種族偏見(jiàn) 【題目】Measuring Racial Bias in International Migration Flows 【作者】Andrew S. Rosenberg，俄亥俄州立大學(xué)政治學(xué)博士候選人 【摘要】 在跨國(guó)遷徙中是否存在種族偏見(jiàn)？盡管人們普遍認(rèn)為種族主義和仇外心理會(huì)影響遷徙進(jìn)程，但并沒(méi)有系統(tǒng)的方法對(duì)此加以證明。因此，在本文中，作者構(gòu)建了一種衡量方法——遷徙偏差（migration deviation）。遷徙偏差是指可觀察到的國(guó)家間移民和基于非種族因素影響的模型（a racially blind model）預(yù)測(cè)的移徙流動(dòng)之間的差異，該模型包含各種各樣的政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)因素。通過(guò)衡量，作者進(jìn)行了描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析，并提供證據(jù)表明，實(shí)際來(lái)自以黑人為主體國(guó)家的移民遠(yuǎn)少于根據(jù)非種族因素影響的模型作出的預(yù)測(cè)。這些結(jié)果為學(xué)者研究國(guó)際種族不平等開(kāi)辟了新的道路。 Are international migration flows racially biased? Despite wide spread consensus that racism and xenophobia affect migration processes, no measure exists to provide systematic evidence on this score. In this research note, Iconstruct such a measure—the migration deviation. Migration deviations are the difference between the observed migration between states, and the flow that we would predict based on a racially blind model that includes a wide variety of political and economic factors. Using this measure, I conduct a descriptive analysis and provide evidence that migrants from majority black states migrate far less than we would expect under a racially blind model. These results pavea new way for scholars to study international racial inequality. 【編譯】金琳 【校對(duì)】徐垚晟 【審核】金磊 國(guó)際危機(jī)中國(guó)家的外交展示：美伊人質(zhì)危機(jī)中的外交合作 【題目】The Diplomatic Presentation of the State in International Crises: Diplomatic Collaboration during the US-Iran Hostage Crisis 【作者】David E. Banks，美利堅(jiān)大學(xué)國(guó)際服務(wù)學(xué)院教授級(jí)講師 【摘要】 關(guān)于危機(jī)升級(jí)或減弱的理論通常關(guān)注的是沖突、壓力和信息問(wèn)題。然而，危機(jī)是否會(huì)升級(jí)有時(shí)可能取決于國(guó)內(nèi)受眾如何理解危機(jī)強(qiáng)度的減弱。在本文中，作者將Putnam的外交雙層博弈模型與Erving Goffman的“互動(dòng)秩序”和“面子”的概念相結(jié)合，創(chuàng)建出“外交展示”（Diplomatic Presentation）機(jī)制。作者論述了在各國(guó)認(rèn)為外交成果符合共同利益，但存在被本國(guó)公眾拒絕的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的情況下，外交展示如何能夠?qū)_(dá)成這一成果起到幫助作用。成功的外交展示需要各國(guó)合謀，從而管理他們的行為表現(xiàn)，進(jìn)行團(tuán)隊(duì)合作，并控制持異見(jiàn)者的影響。在評(píng)估這一機(jī)制時(shí)，作者分析了伊朗人質(zhì)危機(jī)中的外交行為。在這場(chǎng)危機(jī)中，美國(guó)和伊朗的官員在一個(gè)戲劇性的“情景”中合謀串通并分別扮演了特定的角色，從而滿足了美國(guó)和伊朗公眾的情感需求。作者指出，展示這種情景的復(fù)雜性比其他重要理論更好地解釋了危機(jī)的升級(jí)，而這一論點(diǎn)也有助于推動(dòng)國(guó)際關(guān)系中有關(guān)象征性外交的研究，同時(shí)也挑戰(zhàn)了危機(jī)具有對(duì)抗性這一普遍假設(shè)。 Theories of crisis (de-)escalation often focus on conflict, stress, and information problems. However, crisis (de-)escalation may sometimes hinge on how de-escalation is interpreted by domestic audiences. In this article, I combine Putnam's two-level games model of diplomacy with Erving Goffman's concepts of interaction order and face to create a mechanism I call "diplomatic presentation." I show how diplomatic presentation can be instrumental for the crafting of diplomatic outcomes that states believe are in their mutualinterest but that run the risk of being rejected by their domestic publics. Successful diplomatic presentation requires that states collude together to manage their performance, engage in teamwork, and control the impact of unsympathetic audiences. In evaluating this mechanism, I analyze the diplomacy surrounding the Iran Hostage Crisis. During this crisis, regime officials from the United States and Iran colluded in a the atrical "scenario," in which both sides adopted specific roles in order to satisfy the sentiments of US and Iranian publics. I show that complications regarding the presentation of this scenario explain escalation of the crisis better than prominent alternatives. This argument contributes to the growing literature on symbolic diplomacy in international relations, while also challenging common assumptions about the adversarial nature of crises. 【編譯】劉瀟昱 【校對(duì)】徐垚晟 【審核】金磊 對(duì)政府信任的破壞：哥倫比亞前武裝人員間廢棄和平協(xié)議的影響 【題目】Destroying Trust in Government: Effects of a Broken Pact among Colombian Ex-Combatants 【作者】Joakim Kreutz，瑞典斯德哥爾摩大學(xué)政治學(xué)系副教授；瑞典烏普薩拉大學(xué)沖突與和平研究中心兼職研究員；Enzo Nussio，瑞士蘇黎世聯(lián)邦理工學(xué)院安全研究中心資深研究員 【摘要】 國(guó)家內(nèi)戰(zhàn)后沖突各方的不信任是持久和平的主要障礙。然而，現(xiàn)有研究主要聚焦于精英層面的互動(dòng)，忽略了檢驗(yàn)政府和武裝組織中的普通士兵間的信任關(guān)系。這種信任關(guān)系在沖突后的國(guó)家穩(wěn)定進(jìn)程中尤為重要。本文使用的案例是2008年哥倫比亞政府將哥國(guó)前準(zhǔn)軍事組織高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人引渡至美國(guó)的意外決定，從而考察和平協(xié)議的廢棄如何影響了前武裝組織的普通士兵對(duì)政府的信任。在理論上，當(dāng)政府被認(rèn)為犧牲個(gè)人權(quán)益時(shí)，政府可能失去工具性信任；當(dāng)政府被認(rèn)為背棄已作出的承諾時(shí)，政府可能失去規(guī)范性信任。運(yùn)用準(zhǔn)實(shí)驗(yàn)測(cè)量的證據(jù)，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)引渡事件顯著降低了前準(zhǔn)武裝組織普通士兵對(duì)政府的信任，但在對(duì)照組中，與和平協(xié)議無(wú)關(guān)的前游擊隊(duì)普通士兵對(duì)政府的信任并未顯著降低。盡管前準(zhǔn)武裝組織成員被認(rèn)為具有投機(jī)主義特征，但本文的案例研究仍然表明，與失去工具性信任相比，失去規(guī)范性信任更有可能是哥倫比亞政府信任受侵蝕的原因。 Mistrust between conflict parties after civil waris a major hurdle to sustainable peace. However, existing research focuses onelite interactions and has not examined the trust relationship between government and rank-and-file members of armed groups, despite their importance for postconflict stability. We use the unexpected decision of the Colombian government to extradite top-level former paramilitary leaders to the United States in 2008 to identify how a peace deal reversal influences ex-combatants’trust in government. In theory, they may lose trust for instrumental reasons, if they suffer personal costs, or for normative reasons, if they think the government is failing its commitments. Using quasi-experimental survey evidence, we find that extradition decreases trust substantially among ex-paramilitaries, but not in a comparison group of ex-guerrillas not part of the same peace deal. Even though paramilitaries are seen as particularly opportunistic, our evidence suggests that normative rather than in strumentalist considerations led to trust erosion. 【編譯】蔡宇 【校對(duì)】曹鵬鵬 【審核】金磊 民主國(guó)家擁有群體智慧嗎?論決策群體的規(guī)模、政權(quán)類(lèi)型與戰(zhàn)略有效性 【題目】Do Democracies Possess the Wisdom of Crowds? Decision Group Size, Regime Type, and Strategic Effectiveness 【作者】David Blagden，英國(guó)?？巳卮髮W(xué)政治系戰(zhàn)略與安全研究所高級(jí)講師 【摘要】 為什么民主國(guó)家能夠避免彼此之間的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，同時(shí)又能在充滿沖突的國(guó)際政治中尋求自身利益？Brad LeVeck和Neil Narang在《國(guó)際研究季刊》上發(fā)表的最新研究完美地解答了這個(gè)長(zhǎng)期存在的問(wèn)題。“群體智慧”是指一個(gè)足夠龐大的非專(zhuān)業(yè)群體比一個(gè)小眾群體更有可能對(duì)一個(gè)連續(xù)變量做出準(zhǔn)確的估計(jì)，即使這個(gè)小眾群體擁有相關(guān)專(zhuān)家。根據(jù)這一邏輯的實(shí)證數(shù)據(jù)，他們認(rèn)為，民主國(guó)家的戰(zhàn)略?xún)?yōu)勢(shì)在于其龐大、多樣化的決策群體。這種觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，如果這種群體智慧能夠讓民主國(guó)家準(zhǔn)確地評(píng)估他國(guó)的能力和意圖，那么在最大化自身利益的同時(shí)，它們應(yīng)該比其他政權(quán)更能避免談判失敗，即訴諸戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。但不幸的是，民主外交政策的制定卻損害了群體智慧機(jī)制。因此，這篇文章闡明了群體智慧支撐民主和平這一論點(diǎn)的關(guān)鍵缺陷，然后繼續(xù)解釋了無(wú)論政權(quán)類(lèi)型，群體智慧為何仍對(duì)戰(zhàn)略有效性產(chǎn)生重要影響。 What is it about democracies—if anything—that enables them to avoid war with each other while navigating conflictual international politics in pursuit of their own interests? Recent research in International Studies Quarterly by Brad LeVeckand Neil Narang (2017) provides an elegant new answer to this long standing question. Drawing on "wisdom of crowds” logic—the insight that alarge-enough group of inexpert judges is more likely to average towards an accurate estimate of a continuous variable than a smaller group, even when the smaller group contains relevant experts—supported by experimental evidence, they suggest that democracies' strategic advantages lie in their large, diverse decision-making communities. If such crowd wisdom equips democracies to accurately assess others' capabilities and intentions, so the argument goes, then they should be better than alternative regime types at maximizing their own interests while still avoiding the bargaining failure that is resort towar. Unfortunately, however, the politics of democratic foreign policy-making compromise the crowd-wisdom mechanism. This response article thus elucidates key flaws in the argument that crowd wisdom underpins democratic peace, before progressing to explain how the crowd-wisdom insight nonetheless carries important implications—irrespective of regime type—for strategic effectiveness. 【編譯】陳舜波 【校對(duì)】曹鵬鵬 【審核】金磊  【重磅預(yù)告】國(guó)政學(xué)人推出頂級(jí)期刊學(xué)術(shù)動(dòng)態(tài)速遞！ 【新刊速遞】第01期 | Review of International Studies Vol.45, No.4, 2019 【新刊速遞】第02期 | International Relations Vol.33, No.3, 2019 【新刊速遞】第03期 | International Organization Vol.73, No.3, 2019 【新刊速遞】第04期 | World Politics, Vol.71, No.4, 2019 【新刊速遞】第05期 | European Journal of International Relations 【新刊速遞】第06期 | Security Studies, Vol.28, No.4, 2019 【新刊速遞】第07期|International Security, Vol 44, No. 2, 2019 【新刊速遞】第08期| Cambridge Review of International Affairs,Vol.32,No.4 【新刊速遞】第09期| International Relations of Asia-Pacific Vol.19,No.3 【新刊速遞】第11期|Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2019 【新刊速遞】第14期|Chinese Journal of International Politics, No.3, 2019 【新刊速遞】第15期 | International Organization, No.4, 2019 【新刊速遞】第16期 | International Studies Quarterly, No.4, 2019 【新刊速遞】第17期 | World Politics, Vol.72, No.1, 2020 |
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來(lái)自： 國(guó)政學(xué)人 > 《待分類(lèi)》
