【題目】Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Russia and Venezuela

【作者】Timothy Frye, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi

【摘要】現(xiàn)代侍從交易通常通過(guò)中間人進(jìn)行，如政黨活動(dòng)家、企業(yè)雇主、地方勢(shì)力、傳統(tǒng)領(lǐng)袖等。政客們利用這些掮客來(lái)動(dòng)員選民，但我們對(duì)其相對(duì)效果知之甚少。作者認(rèn)為，掮客的有效性取決于他們對(duì)選民的影響力和監(jiān)控能力。政黨活動(dòng)家和企業(yè)雇主是最常見(jiàn)的兩類(lèi)掮客，作者運(yùn)用該理論來(lái)對(duì)比這兩類(lèi)掮客，發(fā)現(xiàn)后者在影響力和監(jiān)控力上都享有許多優(yōu)勢(shì)。作者在委內(nèi)瑞拉和俄羅斯進(jìn)行了實(shí)地調(diào)查實(shí)驗(yàn)，發(fā)現(xiàn)選民對(duì)來(lái)自雇主的投票要求反應(yīng)更為強(qiáng)烈。文章解釋?zhuān)@是因?yàn)檫x民擔(dān)心失業(yè)和雇主對(duì)其工作場(chǎng)所社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)的嵌入。這一研究結(jié)果揭示了最有利于侍從主義的條件，并強(qiáng)調(diào)掮客類(lèi)型有助于理解侍從主義在某些國(guó)家盛行的原因。

Modern clientelist exchange is typically carried out by intermediaries—party activists, employers, local strongmen, traditional leaders, and the like. Politicians use such brokers to mobilize voters, yet little about their relative effectiveness is known. The authors argue that broker effectiveness depends on their leverage over clients and their ability to monitor voters. They apply their theoretical framework to compare two of the most common brokers worldwide, party activists and employers, arguing the latter enjoy numerous advantages along both dimensions. Using survey-based framing experiments in Venezuela and Russia, the authors find voters respond more strongly to turnout appeals from employers than from party activists. To demonstrate mechanisms, the article shows that vulnerability to job loss and embeddedness in workplace social networks make voters more responsive to clientelist mobilization by their bosses. The results shed light on the conditions most conducive to effective clientelism and highlight broker type as important for understanding why clientelism is prevalent in some countries but not others.

【編譯】朱文菡

【校對(duì)】李雯琿

【題目】Voting for Victories：Why Violent Actors Win Postwar Elections

【作者】Sarah Zukerman Daly

【摘要】為什么選民會(huì)投票給對(duì)平民使用暴力的政治人物？盡管采取暴行，參與戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的政黨還是能夠贏得戰(zhàn)后民主選舉。本文運(yùn)用了1970-2010年全球戰(zhàn)后選舉的新的跨國(guó)數(shù)據(jù)，以及薩爾瓦多戰(zhàn)后選舉中的投票、調(diào)查、檔案和采訪數(shù)據(jù)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：交戰(zhàn)方在戰(zhàn)后選舉中的勝利是由于沖突末期軍事力量的分布，而不是戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中的暴力運(yùn)用水平以及選舉中的威脅作用。軍事力量占優(yōu)的交戰(zhàn)方能夠做出和平承諾，即被理解為有能力提供安全，從而擁有良好的聲譽(yù)。這使其擁有“安全籌碼”，更能吸引中間選民。軍事力量占優(yōu)的交戰(zhàn)方提供安全的行為抵消并美化了過(guò)去的暴行，使他們的選舉合理化。本文幫助人們認(rèn)識(shí)暴力事件后的政治生活，這有助于理解為安全而進(jìn)行的選舉，也有助于理解人們看似違背直覺(jué)的投票行為。

Why do citizens elect political actors who have perpetrated violence against the civilian population? Despite their use of atrocities, political parties with deep roots in the belligerent organizations of the past win postwar democratic elections in countries around the world. This article uses new, cross-national data on postwar elections globally between 1970 and 2010, as well as voting, survey, archival, and interview data from El Salvador. It finds that belligerents’ varied electoral success after wars can be explained not by their wartime levels of violence or use of electoral coercion, but by the distribution of military power at the end of conflict. It argues that militarily stronger belligerents are able to claim credit for peace, which translates into a reputation for competence on the provision of security. This enables them to own the security valence issue, which tends to crosscut cleavages, and to appeal to swing voters. The stronger belligerents’ provision of security serves to offset and justify their use of atrocities, rendering their election rational. This article sheds light on political life after episodes of violence. It also contributes to understanding security voting and offers insights into why people vote in seemingly counterintuitive ways.

【編譯】邢戎

【校對(duì)】李雯琿