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Free exchange 自由交流 Making pay work 績效工資的激勵效果 Why bosses should be careful when using performance-related pay 為何老板們要小心使用績效工資 May 25th 2013 |From the print edition  OF ALL a firm’s inputs, its workers’ effort is perhaps the oddest. It is as vital as land, factories or machines, but much harder to control. It is often impossible even to measure. A manager can gauge the firm’s output, but not the effort people put in, beyond crude gauges such as the time they spend on the job. Employees have the informational edge, knowing their own effort, output and skill level. This asymmetry makes it hard for managers to distinguish, for instance, between the low-skilled but diligent and the skilled but lazy. Monitoring schemes to reward hard-working employees and punish slackers can boost effort, but they can backfire badly, too. 在企業(yè)的所有投入中，工人的努力可能是最難捉摸的。這種投入和土地、廠房以及機器一樣關(guān)鍵，但更難控制，甚至往往無法衡量。經(jīng)理人可以測量企業(yè)的產(chǎn)出，但 不能測量人員的努力程度，只能大概估算員工工作時間等比較粗略的指標。而雇員則有信息優(yōu)勢，知道自己的努力程度、成績以及技能水平。這種信息上的不對稱讓 經(jīng)理人很難分辨哪個人技能水平低但很勤奮、哪個人則是技能水平高卻很懶惰。引入考核制度獎勵努力工作的人、懲罰偷懶者能夠提高員工的積極性，但也可能會產(chǎn) 生嚴重的不良影響。 What should firms do? A good place to start is with the worst kind of behaviour: crime. In a paper published in 1968 Gary Becker, of the University of Chicago, set out the factors which policymakers should consider when deciding on what resources they should devote to detection. In his model criminals calculate the risks and benefits of bad behaviour, taking into account the possible monetary reward, the probability of being caught and the subsequent punishment. To cut crime authorities must increase the probability of being caught, the severity of the punishment, or both. This approach can also be applied to less extreme forms of bad behaviour, such as slow or sloppy work: firms may have to monitor individual workers, and then reward the good and punish the bad. 企業(yè)該怎么辦呢？先來考慮最壞的表現(xiàn)行為—犯罪，這可能是一個好的起點。芝加哥大學的加里·貝克爾在1968年發(fā)表的一篇論文中，闡述了政策制定者在投入 資源進行監(jiān)控時要考慮的因素。在他的模型中罪犯們會計算犯罪活動的收益和風險，要考慮可能的金錢收益和被逮捕等懲罰。要降低犯罪率當局需要提高犯罪被抓住 的可能性或懲罰的嚴厲程度，或者雙管齊下。這種思路也可以用來處理不太嚴重的不良行為，比如工作速度慢或工作馬虎。企業(yè)必須監(jiān)控個體工人，獎優(yōu)罰劣。 But a system like this comes with costs. People do not work hard for money alone. They also have other motives, such as doing a good job. In a 1971 paper Edward Deci, of Rochester University, tested the effect that external rewards—cash bonuses or fines—have on such “intrinsic” motivation. Two groups were given a 3D puzzle and asked to create a variety of shapes. Because the puzzle was fun and mentally taxing, intrinsic motivation was high. One group, left to proceed at its own pace, worked hard. A second group was monitored, and given a $1 reward for each shape that was successfully replicated. This payment was later withdrawn, with the result that the second group now put in less effort than the first. Its members switched off, turning instead to Playboy or the New Yorker. Monetary rewards, Mr Deci reasoned, had killed their intrinsic motivation. 但是這樣的系統(tǒng)是需要成本的。人們不只是為了錢才會努力工作。他們也有其他動機，比如把事情做好的動機。愛德華·德西在1971年發(fā)表的一篇論文中描述了 一個外部報酬（現(xiàn)金獎懲）對“內(nèi)在”動機影響的實驗。實驗中兩組人員分別拿到了一套3D拼圖，要求拼出各種各樣的形狀。其中一組任意發(fā)揮，不受干涉，結(jié)果 表現(xiàn)得很努力。另外一組則要進行考核，每拼出一個指定的圖形就獎勵1美元。最后獎勵付給了第二組人員，但是他們的努力程度還不如第一組。這組的成員對工作 沒了興趣，跑去閱讀《花花公子》和《紐約客》等雜志去了。愛德華·德西由此認為，金錢獎勵會扼殺內(nèi)部動機。 Watching workers closely can have other drawbacks. Setting up an incentive scheme for a particular task costs time and money. And it reveals something about the task: that it is important for a firm’s success and considered difficult. In a 2003 study Roland Bénabou, of Princeton University, and Jean Tirole, of Toulouse University, showed how this can lead employees to work more slowly. Efforts might simply shift from speed to accuracy. 密切監(jiān)控工人還有其他缺點。為特定的任務設計一個激勵計劃既花時間也費錢，并且還會透露這項任務的某些屬性，比如：這是一項對于企業(yè)的成功來說很重要的任 務，可能會比較難。2003年普林斯頓大學的羅蘭·伯拉布和圖盧茲大學的讓·梯若爾研究發(fā)現(xiàn)這會讓員工的工作速度變慢，員工努力的方向從速度轉(zhuǎn)向了準確 性。 The effects of monitoring may be even worse if “reciprocity” is taken into account. Matthew Rabin, of the University of California, Berkeley, explored this concept in a paper in 1993. People with a strong sense of fairness like to help those whom they perceive as helpful. But the flip side is that they will punish those they see as being unhelpful. So a monopolist charging rip-off prices may be shunned, even if the shopper really wants the product. Similarly, an unfair boss may be punished with bad work, even if this hurts the worker too. 如果考慮到“以牙還牙”效應的影響，監(jiān)控員工的影響還可能更糟。加州大學伯克利分校的馬修·拉賓在1993年的一篇論文中解釋了這個概念。具有強烈的公平 感的人喜歡幫助那些他們認為是愿意幫忙的人。但反過來，他們也會懲罰那些被認為是不愿幫忙的人。所以人們不愿搭理索要高價的壟斷者，即使他提供的產(chǎn)品很有 吸引力。同樣，工人們會通過把事情搞糟的方法來懲罰不公平的老板，即使他們本身也因此遭受損失。 If monitoring has both benefits and costs, what is the right level? Michèle Belot, of Edinburgh University, and Marina Schr?der, of Magdeburg University, have devised a test. They gave volunteers boxes containing €780 ($1,010) in coins and asked them to separate these into different types. The job is trickier than it sounds, because the euro zone has 160 different types of coin: eight values, from one cent to €2, in 20 designs, one for each of the zone’s 17 members plus Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican. The task, for which volunteers were paid €20, has some clever properties. First, it can be completed perfectly with effort but not much skill (time pressure was minimal and volunteers were allowed to take the boxes home). Second, bad work can be measured and comes in several forms. The coins could be badly sorted. The box could be returned late. And the coins might be stolen: the boxes contained Vatican coins which are worth more to collectors than their face value. By replacing a 50-cent piece from the Vatican (worth around €3 in online auctions) with a regular 50-cent coin, the volunteer could net €2.50. 如果監(jiān)控雖然有成本也能帶來好處，那么什么水平的監(jiān)控最合適呢？愛丁堡大學的米歇爾·貝洛和馬格德堡大學的瑪麗娜·施羅德設計了一項測試。他們每個志愿者 發(fā)一個裝有780歐元硬幣（相當于1010美元）的盒子，請他們給硬幣分類。這個測試實際上比看上去的要復雜：歐盟有160種不同的硬幣，從一分到兩歐元 一共有8種面值、17個歐元國家再加上摩納哥、圣馬力諾和梵蒂岡一共20套設計方案。完成這些工作志愿者將獲得20歐元的報酬，其中有許多機巧。首先，完 成這些工作只需要付出努力，不需要什么技術(shù)水平（時間很寬松、志愿者還可以把盒子帶回家）。其次，工作做得不好可以表現(xiàn)為多種不同的形式，而且可以進行衡 量：硬幣可能被分錯類、盒子交還的時間可能會拖延，還有硬幣可能會被偷換—盒子里有梵蒂岡發(fā)行的硬幣，對于收藏者而言它們的價值高于面值。把一個50分的梵蒂岡硬幣（網(wǎng)上拍賣價在3歐元左右）換成一個普通的50分硬幣，志愿者就賺到了2.5歐元。 High bar or no bar 要么嚴苛，要么不管 The researchers tested different configurations of monitoring and rewards. A control group was not supervised at all and paid immediately regardless of performance. Two other groups were watched, and rewarded according to their performance. The first scheme was pretty lax: workers lost just €1 for every ten mistakes. The second was much harsher: the payment was cut by €15 if more than two coins were wrongly identified. 測試人員對考核和獎勵的不同方案進行了測試。有一個完全不做考核，不管工作完成得怎么樣做完立即付款。還有兩個組則進行了考核。第一組的考核很寬松，每犯十個錯誤扣1歐元。第二組的考核要嚴厲得多，如果硬幣弄錯兩個以上，報酬減少15歐元。 The results suggest that lax monitoring is a bad option: 30% of volunteers made more than ten mistakes—worse than the group with no supervision. On top of this, late returns increased. This means that the resources devoted to monitoring were wasted. The stricter regime, however, did offer some benefits. Accuracy improved, with only 16% of volunteers making more than ten mistakes. But some also shifted their effort, working more slowly and handing the coins in late. Neither system had any effect on theft: in all three groups one in ten volunteers stole coins. 結(jié)果表明寬松的考核是件壞事?？己藢捤傻慕M中有30%的志愿者犯的錯誤超過10個，比完全不考核的組還要差。而且延期歸還盒子的情況也增加了。這說明為考 核所付出的資源全都浪費掉了。然而最后一個組的嚴格考核，帶來了一定的好處。準確率提高了，只有16%的志愿者犯的錯誤超過了10個。但這也使得志愿者的 努力方向發(fā)生了變化，工作完成得更慢、盒子交回的時間更遲了。不管哪一種方案對偷換硬幣的問題都沒有影響，這三個組中都是每十個志愿者就會有一個偷換硬 幣。 In economics opting for the middle ground is usually best. But in this case the extremes seem to be a better choice: monitor hard, or do not monitor at all. A little bit of monitoring only annoys the good workers, causing them to slacken off. And sometimes the wisest thing is just to let people get on with the job. 在經(jīng)濟學中，折衷方案往往是最佳方案。但在這個案例里似乎“走極端”更好：考核嚴格或完全不考核都可以。一點點考核只會讓好工人厭煩、懈怠。有時最明智的做法是讓人們自由發(fā)揮。 |
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