Remittance corridors

匯款通道

New rivers of gold

資金流動(dòng)的新方向

Remittances from unlikely places are helping poorcountries in the downturn

從意想不到的地區(qū)流出的匯款有助于窮國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇

Apr 28th 2012 | TAPACHULA | from the print edition 

  

IN TAPACHULA, a furnace of a city in southern Mexico, people line up inside an air-conditioned branch of Banco Azteca to process their remittances. Last year Mexicans received an estimated $24 billion from friends and family working abroad, mainly in the United States, with which Mexico forms the world’s busiest remittance corridor (see map). But a closer look at the Tapachulan queue shows how the remittance business is changing. Many are not Mexicans receiving cash from America, but migrant workers sending it back home to Guatemalaor Honduras.“Very similar to what happens at the other border,” observes Jorge LuisValdivieso, the bank’s regional administrator, referring to Mexico’s better-known northern frontier.

墨西哥南部的塔帕丘拉，氣候炎熱，是一個(gè)火爐之城。在阿茲特克銀行當(dāng)?shù)氐姆中欣?，人們吹著空調(diào)，排起長(zhǎng)長(zhǎng)的隊(duì)伍，等待辦理匯兌業(yè)務(wù)。據(jù)估計(jì)，去年墨西哥收到了240億美元的外匯。這些錢大多是在美國(guó)工作的墨西哥人向國(guó)內(nèi)親友的匯款。美國(guó)與墨西哥之間已建立起一條世界上最繁忙的匯款路線（見圖）。但是如果仔細(xì)觀察塔帕丘拉的那些排隊(duì)者，能發(fā)現(xiàn)匯兌業(yè)務(wù)正在發(fā)生轉(zhuǎn)變。許多辦理業(yè)務(wù)的不是來兌取匯款的墨西哥人，而是準(zhǔn)備把錢匯回瓜迪馬拉或者洪都拉斯的外國(guó)勞工。當(dāng)提到墨西哥更出名的北方邊界時(shí)，阿茲特克銀行的區(qū)域經(jīng)理說：“這的情況和北方的銀行發(fā)生的很相似”。

The value of remittances to poor countries is enormous. Since 1996 they have been worth more than all overseas-development aid, and for most of the past decade more than private debt and portfolio equity inflows. In 2011remittances to poor countries totalled $372 billion, according to the WorldBank (total remittances, including to the rich world, came to $501 billion).That is not far off the total amount of foreign direct investment that flowed to poor countries. Given that cash is ferried home stuffed into socks as well as by wire transfer, the real total could be 50% higher.

窮國(guó)收到的匯款金額十分巨大。自1996年以來，這些匯款的金額一直超過所有的海外開發(fā)援助，在過去十年的大多數(shù)年份，也超過了私人債務(wù)和股票組合流入。世界銀行的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，2011年匯往窮國(guó)的匯款總計(jì)達(dá)3720億美元（加上匯往富國(guó)的匯款，全部匯款總計(jì)5010億美元）。這接近流入窮國(guó)的國(guó)外直接投資的總額。如果加上私人攜帶回國(guó)的現(xiàn)金，實(shí)際匯款總額可能比顯示數(shù)據(jù)多50%。 

Remittances are not just big, but growing—they have nearly quadrupled since the turn of the millennium—and resilient. In 2009, when economies around the world crashed, remittances to poor countries fell by a modest 5%, and by 2010 had bounced back to record levels. By contrast, foreign direct investment inpoor countries fell by a third during the crisis, and portfolio inflows fell by more than half. “The most remarkable thing about remittances today is theircontinued growth, year after year, despite the global economic crisis,” says Dilip Ratha, head of migration and remittances at the World Bank.

匯款額不僅巨大而且一直在增長(zhǎng)——從2000年以來，匯款額幾乎增長(zhǎng)了3倍。另外在經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇時(shí)，匯款額能從低谷快速反彈。2009年全球經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)，匯往窮國(guó)的匯款僅下降了5%，2010年底就反彈回了最高水平。與此相對(duì)的是，對(duì)窮國(guó)的國(guó)外直接投資在危機(jī)中下跌了三分之一，股票流入下降了一半還多。世界銀行移民匯兌機(jī)構(gòu)的負(fù)責(zé)人Dilip Ratha說：“關(guān)于匯兌最值得注意的是，盡管處在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)的環(huán)境下，其總額卻在逐年持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)”。

One reason for this apparent boom is simply that the data are better. Moneysenders such as Western Union and MoneyGram have improved their reporting to central banks. Oversight has tightened since September 11th 2001. This has led to big jumps in some numbers: Nigeria posteda near-doubling of remittance receipts in 2007. Where governments are sensitive about providing information, economists have used other methods. India, for instance, subjects remittances to Bangladesh to stringent tests. But by examining migration data, the World Bank reckons thatsome $3.8 billion probably crosses the border every year.

匯款額明顯增長(zhǎng)的一個(gè)原因僅僅是因?yàn)橄嚓P(guān)數(shù)據(jù)更全面了。匯款機(jī)構(gòu)，例如西聯(lián)、速匯金向中央銀行上報(bào)的資料得到完善。從2001年9月11日起，匯款監(jiān)察更加嚴(yán)格。這導(dǎo)致一些地區(qū)的數(shù)據(jù)跨越式增長(zhǎng)：尼日尼亞發(fā)布的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，該國(guó)在2007年收到的外匯接近上年的兩倍。在政府不愿提供信息的那些國(guó)家，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家用其他的方法計(jì)算匯款額。例如，雖然印度限制向孟加拉匯款，但世界銀行通過監(jiān)測(cè)移民數(shù)據(jù)，估計(jì)每年大約有38億美金在兩國(guó)間流通。

Partly thanks to these techniques, it is now known that remittances come from a wider variety of countries than was previously thought. This might inturn explain how they have avoided being affected by Wall Street’s hiccups. In 1970 46% of recorded remittances were reckoned to originate in America. By 2010 America’s share was just 17%. One big new player is the Gulf, which has sucked in migrant workers since the oil boom. Saudi Arabiais now the world’s biggest sender of remittances after America,posting $27 billion in 2010, mostly to the families of South Asians and Africans who toil on its building sites and clean its homes. More than half ofall remittances to South Asia come from the Gulf; worldwide, the region sends almost as many remittances to poor countriesas western Europe does.

部分地受益于這些方法，人們現(xiàn)在得知與匯款相關(guān)國(guó)家的名單比以前更廣泛。這反過來又解釋了人們?cè)趺幢苊馐苋A爾街波動(dòng)的影響。1970年，有記錄可查的匯款估計(jì)46%來自美國(guó)。到2010底，美國(guó)所占的份額僅有17%。自從石油大發(fā)現(xiàn)以來，大量的外國(guó)勞工涌入海灣地區(qū)，現(xiàn)在此地已成為一個(gè)重要的匯款來源地。繼美國(guó)之后，沙特現(xiàn)在是世界上匯款額最大的國(guó)家。2010年沙特公布的匯款額達(dá)到了 270億美元，絕大多數(shù)都是在沙特工作的南亞和非洲的建筑工人和清潔工匯往國(guó)內(nèi)家人的匯款。匯往南亞的匯款超過一半來自海灣地區(qū)；從全球范圍內(nèi)來看，這一地區(qū)匯往窮國(guó)的匯款額幾乎和整個(gè)西歐的一樣。

Expensive oil has made Russia a big destination for immigrants, too. In 2000 it was only the 17th-biggest remitter in the world—indeed, it was a net receiver. But by 2010 it was the fourth-largest sender, dispatching nearly $19 billion, mostly to Central Asia. Remittances from Russiaare worth more than a fifth of Tajikistan’s economy (see chart).

高昂的石油價(jià)格使得俄羅斯也成了許多移民的目的國(guó)。2000年，俄羅斯在全球匯款額排名中僅列第17位——實(shí)際上，它是一個(gè)凈收匯國(guó)。但是到2010年底，俄羅斯的排名已升到第四位，年匯款達(dá)到了將近190億美元，大部分匯款匯往中亞地區(qū)。從俄羅斯匯往塔吉克斯坦的匯款額超過了塔吉克斯坦整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)收入的五分之一(見表)。

 

Though they are less volatile than many types of income, remittances are not immune to fluctuations. Cash flows to Mexico last year were still 12% lower than their pre-crash peak, partly because many Mexican migrants worked in the American construction sector, which is still reeling. The “Arab spring” of 2011 made a dent in remittance receipts in the Middle East and Africa, asmigrant workers from the region fled countries such as Libya. An exception was Egypt,where receipts shot up by 14%. One reason may be that exiled Egyptians returned home with their savings; another is that a fall in property prices encouraged émigrés to snap up bargains.

雖然匯款額不像其他類型的收入那樣易于波動(dòng)，但是它也會(huì)波動(dòng)。去年流入墨西哥的現(xiàn)金流比其峰值低了12%。許多墨西哥移民在美國(guó)建筑業(yè)工作，而美國(guó)的建筑業(yè)現(xiàn)在仍不景氣，這是現(xiàn)金流下降的部分原因。2011年的“阿拉伯之春”導(dǎo)致外國(guó)勞工逃離例如利比亞之類的國(guó)家，所以中東和非洲匯款額明顯減少。不過埃及是個(gè)例外，那里的收匯額激增了14%。其中一個(gè)原因可能是流亡的埃及人帶著自己的積蓄回到了本國(guó)；另一個(gè)原因是不動(dòng)產(chǎn)的價(jià)格下降刺激流亡者搶購便宜貨。

Currency fluctuations can also skew remittance patterns. American greenbacks and euros are no longer sought after in those African countrieswhere currencies have appreciated sharply in real terms thanks to demand for the commodities they export. “When you send dollars back to a family in Angola, they don’t feel as rich as before,” says Marcelo Giugale of the World Bank. Workingin Europe for five years no longer buys a house back home.

貨幣波動(dòng)也可能扭曲匯款的模式。在那些非洲國(guó)家，因?yàn)閷?duì)其出口產(chǎn)品需求的增長(zhǎng)，導(dǎo)致其貨幣真實(shí)價(jià)值猛烈上漲，所以美元和歐元在那些地區(qū)不再受追捧。世界銀行的Marcelo Giugale說：“現(xiàn)在匯美元回剛果，人們不再覺得像以前那么值錢”。在歐洲工作五年賺的錢再也不夠回家買棟房子了。

The question is whether migrants will react by spending longer in far-flungdestinations, or by staying closer to home. Many already go for the secondoption: one-tenth of remittances to Africacome from within the continent. South  Africa sends most of its $1.4 billion inremittances to its neighbours, for example.

問題是外國(guó)勞工愿意在遠(yuǎn)離家鄉(xiāng)的地方工作更久還是待在離家近點(diǎn)的地方。很多人已經(jīng)選擇了后者：非洲十分之一的匯款來自本大陸。例如，南非14億美元的匯款額，絕大多數(shù)匯往其領(lǐng)國(guó)。

In the rich world, many countries have closed their borders to protect home-grown workers. Americahas made its southern frontier harder to cross, which partly explains the slowdown in immigration from Mexico.Emigration has risen, too, since the economy stalled. But perhaps because they know it will be harder to come back, migrants are staying longer. According to the Pew Hispanic Centre, 27% of Mexicans deported from America in 2010 had been in the country for at least a year, up from 6% in 2005. That may help explain why remittances from Americafell by only 5% in 2009, whereas in Britain, which has open borders with some of its biggest senders of immigrants, they fell by 27% (exchange rates played a part, too). Stricter border controls keep migrants in as well asout, and the remittances flowing.

在富裕的地區(qū)，許多國(guó)家封鎖邊界以保護(hù)本國(guó)的工人。美國(guó)已嚴(yán)格限制外國(guó)人由其南部邊界入境，這可以部分解釋為什么墨西哥移民勢(shì)頭下降。自從經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷以來，移民的數(shù)量也有所上升。但是也許是因?yàn)樗麄冎酪坏┗貒?guó)，將更難回來，所以逗留的時(shí)間更長(zhǎng)了。據(jù)Pew Hispanic中心的數(shù)據(jù)，2010年被驅(qū)逐出境的墨西哥人，27%在美國(guó)待了至少一年，這一數(shù)據(jù)比2005年上漲了5%。這有助于解釋為什么從美國(guó)的匯款在2009年僅下降了5%，而同期，英國(guó)雖然對(duì)其最大的移民匯款國(guó)開放了邊界，但其匯款額卻下降了27%（匯率變化也對(duì)其有影響）。更嚴(yán)格的邊界限制使得移民難以入境，也延長(zhǎng)了移民逗留的時(shí)間，還影響了匯款總額。

from the print edition | Finance and economics